Delay in the MMRCA induction will force the IAF to deploy late 20th century aircraft in the battlefield of the 2020s

The inordinate delay in the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) procurement programme for the Indian Air Force (IAF) is a major setback to its modernisation plans. It certainly will have an adverse impact on the operational capability and force levels of the IAF not only now, but extending into the next two decades.

Background

Around three decades ago a need was felt to find a replacement for the mainstay of the IAF’s combat fleet, the MiG-21 air defence fighter aircraft. The assessment was that the MiG-21 fleet would have to be phased out commencing mid-1990s. A decision was taken to locally design, develop and induct a light combat aircraft (LCA) with a multi-role capability as its successor. To meet the needs of the Indian Navy, a carrier variant was also required, capable of short take-off and barrier arrested recovery (STOBAR) from decks with ramps.

The Air Staff Requirement (ASR) for the IAF variant was not finalised till late 1985 and it was clear then itself that the original target of first flight in 1990 and squadron induction in 1995 would not be met. The maiden flight was undertaken in 2001. Even in the 1980s, the IAF was well below its optimum level in respect of the number of combat aircraft squadrons on its inventory. The LCA project did achieve its aim of developing the second Indian fighter aircraft, after the HF-24; but the gestation period has extended to over three decades, 32 years to be precise. The final product, which is on the verge of entering squadron service now as the LCA Mk I, has not met with the expectations of the IAF in terms of time frame for delivery and performance. The thinking now is that it would at best be a transition type and only its successor, the LCA Mk II will be a suitable aircraft with the performance required to be effective in the current threat scenario. As far as the naval variant goes, the prototypes are still in the process of flight trials and one has successfully carried out take-off and landing from an aircraft carrier.

All this has resulted in the LCA failing to smoothly replace the MiG-21. Delays have eroded its technology edge. The result had been degradation of the fighter fleet in numbers as well as in capability. The Pakistani Air Force (PAF) is fast cacthing up with the IAF in terms of mid-air refuelling and AWACS capabilities. Chinese technology has improved to the extent that their People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) fields state-of-the-art systems in large numbers and is no longer dependent on Russian expertise. Some of these systems, including stealth aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, will be made available to Pakistan also. India is losing the edge in quality vis-à-vis Pakistan and China and has always been behind in numbers as far as China is concerned.

The Multi-Role Combat Aircraft

In view of the delay in the LCA programme as well as the need to replace the MiG-23, the MiG-27 and the Jaguar fleets in not too distant a future, in 2001 the IAF initiated a proposal for the acquisition of 126 multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) in the 15- to 20-tonne class. Later the ASR was revised with weight revised to 24 tonnes. The nomenclature was changed to MMRCA. The first 18 aircraft was to be imported and the rest to be progressively manufactured in India. However, it was still hoped that the LCA would be inducted by 2005.

The request for information (RFI) was sent for the Mirage 2000-5 Mk2, F-16 C/D, MiG-29OVT and the JAS 39 Gripen. The delay in issuing the RFI led to Dassault replacing the Mirage 2000-5 offer with the Rafale, the MiG consortium substituting the MiG-29OVT with the MiG-35 and the Eurofighter Typhoon as well as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet entered the fray. The list of contenders included the Rafale, F-16 IN, the F/A-18 IN, the MiG-35, the Typhoon and the Gripen. The Rafale had a naval variant capable of both STOBAR and catapult assisted take-off and barrier arrested recovery (CATOBAR) make it suitable for ramp as well as flat deck carrier operations without modifications. Finally in August 2007, the request for proposal (RFP) was sent to the bidders with replies expected within six months. Technical evaluations were completed by end May 2009. Flight evaluations commenced in August 2009 were completed in December 2010. The Typhoon and the Rafale were shortlisted.

The IAF hoped to have the contract inked by July 2011. It remained a hope. Problems surfaced regarding the calculation of life-cycle costs. At the end of January 2012, the Rafale was finally selected for negotiations based on lower unit and life-cycle costs. Delays and Rafale upgrades led to cost escalations from $12 billion in 2007 to $18 billion in 2014 and $28 billion in 2014. The Eurofighter consortium (EADS) made a pitch by lowering their price and even Saab tried to remain in the race by offering to assist in developing the LCA Mk II. The US also lobbied for their aircraft. However a rethink was ruled out.

The latest hurdle is the transfer of technology. Dassault Aviation is reluctant to be held liable for both the delivery schedule and quality control for the 108 out of the total 126 aircraft to be manufactured in India under licence since they have no control over the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the licensee. They also have reservations about the capability of our defense industry to absorb and handle the technologies being transferred including the sophisticated active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.

Both parties now state that more negotiations are needed. As time passes, costs continue to escalate. Technologies develop fast and the IAF will be forced to ramp up their specification requirements to cater for acquisitions made by potential adversaries. This will drive up costs further and lead to further delay. The delays in the LCA has already drawn down force levels to dangerous lows and forced the IAF to continue to deploy obsolete aircraft. Delay in the MMRCA induction as it will take at least three years from award of contract to first induction will force the IAF to deploy late 20th century aircraft in the battlefield of the 2020s.

The Future

The LCA was to replace the MiG-21. It has not even started to do that even 32 years down the line. Its gestation period has been longer than the total combat life of some fighter aircraft. Time is critical and delays have made the LCA in its Mk I avatar almost obsolescent. To the credit of the programme, it has provided a good learning experience for the Indian aerospace industry.

The MMRCA was envisaged as a gap filler to mitigate the drawdown of the combat fleet, basically the MiG-27 and the Jaguar. But because of the delay in the LCA programme, the MMRCA may effectively be a replacement only for the MiG-21 fleet. The IAF will get into a critical situation if the MMRCA induction is delayed further Induction of all 126 aircraft and their operationalisaion could extend to well beyond the mid-2020s.

Indications are that the joint development of the fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) is also well behind schedule. It will be a tragedy if its induction in the Indian variant is soon followed by its induction in the Russian export variant in the PLAAF and the PAF. Exports from Russia to Iran, South Korea and possibly China are all possibilities and it may well trickle down to Pakistan.

This will mean a force of Su-30MKI and LCA with limited capability and numbers will be the sole assets of the IAF from the mid-2020s till the FGFA becomes a reality. Force levels would drop so much that the IAF will not be able to cope with the threat from the adversaries. A heavy fighter optimised for long range and large weapons loads, the Su-30MKI will be forced to operate in all roles including close air support and short range interdiction since the IAF will have nothing smaller and lighter that can survive in combat in the 2020s.

The IAF has no effective ‘Plan B’ if the MMRCA deal falls through. It will have to be dependent on the Su-30MKI alone and will have to augment production. Let alone a single nation or vendor dependence, the IAF would have sunk to a new low of a single aircraft type dependence.

The option is to complete the negotiations so that induction starts as soon as possible. One option is to increase the number of aircraft imported directly from the selected vendor in flyaway condition so that the IAF has a force in place sooner. Whether it will be acceptable in the current context of the new thrust on ‘Make in India’, is another matter. The next option is to convince the vendor that technology transfer is viable and quality control and production schedules in India can be met with. The last is to relax the terms imposed on the vendor. The supplier’s only constraint is the degree of financial criticality this contract has as far as the French military aviation industry is concerned. If it is critical to Dassault’s future business prospects, they will meet with the demands. Ultimately, it hinges on finances and profitability for the vendor versus India’s military compulsions. The MMRCA deal is a pointer to the dangers inherent in delayed decision making.