More hostage taking, particularly of ground level politicians and government officials, are well on the cards – a weak buckling government will have rippling effect in other Maoist-infested states

The scramble to chalk out a uniform hostage policy within days of the Prime Minister chairing an internal security meeting of Chief Ministers shows our pathetic approach in dealing with the Maoist problem. This, despite the Prime Minister declaring it as the biggest threat to national security for past several years in the background of numerous hostage situations having occurred in the past.

In 1989, the government accepted the demands of the terrorists and released five jailed JKLF terrorists in exchange for Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, Indian Home Minister (HM). There had been talk of stage managed kidnapping with JKLF Chairman Mohammad Yasin Malik working in tandem with the HM and Indian intelligence operatives as the event occurred within five days of HM taking oath and Rubaiya was reportedly kept for initial three days in a government official’s residence. This is no surprise considering R&AW’s cross purpose games in Sri Lanka while the IPKF battled LTTE and present-day funding of Hurriyat by the Intelligence Bureau.

The release of the JKLF militants set off a self-perpetuating spiral of violence in J&K. Later, 1999 witnessed the IC 814 hijack drama and our government gave in by releasing three jailed HuM terrorists—Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh and Masood Azhar – all Pakistanis who stoked militancy in J&K, Masood Azhar later raising JeM and having maximum Indian blood on his hands including attacks on J&K Legislative Assembly and the Indian Parliament in 2001.

Had the recent abductions of Italian Paolo Bosusco, Orissa MLA Jhina Hikaka and Chhattisgarh’s Sukma District Collector Alex Paul Menon not taken place, the Indian state would have felt no need to chalk out a uniform hostage response policy. The entire gamut in every hostage drama has reeked of a hapless state negotiating under extreme duress. Drift has been the name of the game all along. The number of hardcore Maoists released in exchange of these individuals will never be known but more significant is the issue of gross ignorance in so doing on the psyche of the security forces pursuant to releasing jailed terrorists/militants apprehended at the cost of sweat, blood and sacrifices. No wonder the tail of the Maoists is up. The recent attack on the National Mineral Development Corporation, Dantewada killing five CISF men, taking away their weapons and concurrent killing of a police officer in Kanker indicate more such incidents will follow.

More hostage taking, particularly of ground level politicians and government officials, are well on the cards – a weak buckling government will have rippling effect in other Maoist-infested states. Chalking out a uniform hostage response policy by itself is no panacea because for it to yield result the twin requirements of political will and execution have to be met.

How is the Centre going to ensure political will at state level when the latter show them two fingers like in the instant case of NCTC? Then comes the execution part – just about anyone cannot handle negotiations. The interlocutors must be trained and skilled followed by physical action where required – take the IC 814 hostage case where a trained force like the NSG could not even be activated while the aircraft was on ground in Amritsar for considerable time. There is no alternative other than a centralised response to hostage situations – this should be the forte of the Home Ministry. For the states to not accept it on grounds of turf encroachment will be suicidal. State Counter Terrorism Centres (SCTC) must be established duly linked with NCTC through NATGRID. If we are to fight terror successfully, it must be delinked from law and order and fought in a centralised and synergised manner.

The views expressed herein are the personal views of the author.