Indian Army must review its counterinfiltration operating procedure on the LoC. In all likelihood commanders on ground are constrained by an overwhelming urge to look for signal from the brass before taking any tough step.

It was ironic that India’s official statement on the brazen incident of killing five Indian soldiers through a cross border raid went through a series of flip flops before finally fixing the blame on the Pakistan Army. This was all the more pitiable when just days before Pakistan televised Naik Sule Khan bragging about how Captain Saurabh Kalia and his patrol were killed by the Pakistan Army with the usual lie that the Indian patrol had crossed over to the Pakistani side across the line of control (LoC). There should have been no hesitation in naming the Pakistani Army in the first instance during the recent cross border raid. Self respect of a nation cannot be sacrificed on the altar of politicking and Nehruvian utopia of non-existent peace. Witness the alacrity with which the US President Barack Obama has cancelled his summit with Russian President Vladamir Putin because of Russia having given asylum to Snowden for just one year. In this case, we have lost five Indian soldiers.

Despite the recent barbaric cross border raid by Pakistan, our political hierarchy is eager to open immediate talks with Pakistan.

The ceasfire put in place at the line of control (LoC) between India and Pakistan in November 2003, is all but a charade now. Brutal killings, cross-border raids, medium and heavy firing with small arms and mortars have increased exponentially over the past couple of years. This calendar year alone, there have been 57 ceasfire violations by Pakistan, a whopping 80 per cent jump from 2012. The number of infiltration attempts have risen dramatically too. But more than anything else, it is the intention of the Pakistani Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir that has not changed, ceasefire or no ceasefire.

Recall what the then Northern Army Commander Lt General K.T. Parnaik told me during an interview on June 17 less than two months ago: “We have to understand that the infrastructure that supports and propels this entire proxy war across the border is intact, whether they are the training camps or the launching pads or the communication facilities. Secondly, the continued efforts of the establishment in Pakistan to push the infiltrators across the LoC continues.

“The number of ceasefire violations that we have had and a large number of incidents in which they had tried to breach the LoC and the fence, has been detected in the past. So I feel as long as the intention on the infrastructure doesn’t change, we cannot keep our guard down. While these figures have marginally changed over a period of time, it is not the numbers that are important, it is the fact that they continue to be there and every season these camps get activated for training and motivation. Intelligence agencies have confirmed that these camps continue to be active. So they are talking about 42 camps across and 4,000-5,000 is generally the strength. They come for training and go away, but the important part is why should the adversary maintain these camps, why should they give them the patronage? They get arms, equipment, state-of-the-art communication equipment and wherewithal to carry out infiltration. This itself highlights the problems that exist today. Despite a number of dialogues, there is no improvement, that’s why we can’t let our guard down.”

Words of a true professional who foresaw what is in store.

Despite all the professed willingness showed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to take the peace process with India forward, as long as the Pakistani Army and ISI along with groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba, remain inimical to India, no amount of dialogue will calm the situation on the LoC.

The Indian establishment, especially those pushing for talks with Pakistan at any cost must take this factor into account. Can Sharif ensure the closure of these camps? Can New Delhi hold Islamabad accountable to the promise it made in January 2004 that Pakistan will not allow its territory or territory controlled by it to be used by terrorists for anti-India activities?

If there is no guarantee on this count, no amount of conferences on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly or otherwise, are going to bear any fruit.

That said, the Indian security establishment, especially the Indian Army will have to look within and review some of the procedures and tactics that are being employed along the LoC. When the January beheading of an Indian soldier happened, there were murmurs that there could have been tactical errors on the part of the patrol party that allowed the Pakistani Border Action Team (BAT) to kill the two Indian soldiers.

After the killing of five soldiers on Monday night-Tuesday morning, the murmurs have become louder. An initial internal assessment of the incident points to tactical lapses by the local unit. A couple of questions need quick answers for the situation to be rectified. One, why was the area domination patrol strenth only six and not a minimum of ten (a section) as is the standrad practice? Some reports have suggested that the outgoing ballation (21 Bihar) was showing the incoming unit (14 Maratha) the key locations and a bunker ahead of the fence but well within the LoC. If that be so, why take the new unit on a familiarisation exercise at night? Also was the patrolling pattern repeated without variation over a prolonged period giving the adversary the chance to observe it closely and then attack at a time and place of its choosing?

No doubt, all these possible shortcomings are being looked into. Surely the commanders on ground would know that the most vulnerable period on the LoC is during the change over of units. The old unit is in transfer mode, the new one is on unfamiliar territory. That’s when the adversary is known to strike. In 2010, in the Uri sector, two Indian soldiers were beheaded in exactly these circumstances. That Indian troops hit back appropriately with similar tactics is also well known.

But there is a larger question here posed by veterans of Kashmir deployment: Have commanders on the ground lost the ability to take initiative and launch punitive action against raiding Pakistani forces? Has the leadership developed cold feet in taking actions that are well within its realm of responsibility?

Sample what one veteran e-mailed to me in the immediate aftermath of the killing of five soldiers: “If I were the CO, I would have launched a decisive counter attack to make the enemy pay with or without permission from my superiors and to hell with the consequences. Such actions are not without precedents. In the early 1960s, there was an incident of beheading in Blue Sector (J&K) which was answered by an immediate counter attack by the battalion after which there was no such incident till the battalion was de-inducted. The Company Commander later on rose to be an Army Commander. And then there was a Corps Commander (who later on became the Chief) who ordered punitive action with telling effect without any sanction from the Army Commander. When pulled up, he said that seeking permission for local actions would only result in delaying the response which would have finally ended in a stalemate. No further questions were asked. At present we only seem to be reacting instead of (pre-) acting and/or pro-acting. It’s time we went on the offensive with a series of attacks which will give a clear message to the enemy that we mean business. Endless inaction on our part will certainly leave us in a demoralised state. If this course leads to war, so be it. Patience seems to be our only strong point at present.”

2013, admittedly is not the 1960s but bold local commanders are known to be appropriately aggressive even in the past half a dozen years. Of late, however, there is a tendency to be ultra cautious, to look for directions from the top before taking any step considered out of the box.

After all is said and done, Indian Army must also review its counter-infiltration operating procedure on the LoC. In all likelihood, commanders on ground are constrained by an overwhelming urge to look for signal from the brass before taking any tough step.

They will have to revisit the old adage: what is militarily desirable is not necessarily politically correct. They must know that mixing political expediency with military action is suicidal. Only then Indian Army officers can regain the confidence of its men and thereby the Indian citizens.