The Author is Former Director General of Information Systems and A Special Forces Veteran, Indian Army

India and the US have signed a 10-year Defence Framework Agreement in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on October 31, 2025. The agreement was signed by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, formalising the strategic deepening of bilateral defence cooperation and establishing a roadmap for the next decade focusing on information sharing, joint training, technology exchange, and regional deterrence, signalling an enhanced Indo-US alignment in the Indo-Pacific. Hegseth said, "Our strategic alignment is built on shared interests, mutual trust, and a commitment to a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific."

The agreement formalised the strategic deepening of bilateral defence cooperation and establishes a roadmap for the next decade focusing on information sharing, joint training, technology exchange, and regional deterrence

Views have been expressed in the media that signing of this 10-year Defence Framework Agreement could have waited till the India-US trade deal was signed, especially since US President Donald Trump continues to threaten India with 50 per cent tariffs and more. But Trump is highly unpredictable. He wasn't interested in the ASEAN Summit in Malaysia, on whose sidelines this framework was signed. In addition, Trump isn't interested in summits of Climate Change and G20. He is also indicating preference for bilateral defence deals with countries like Australia, South Korea, Japan and Philippines over the Quad.

The US had earlier termed the relationship with India as a 'Non-NATO Ally', 'Major Defence Partner' and later as a 'Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership', with both countries having signed the four foundational defence agreements to enhance military cooperation; the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, the Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in 2020. Notably, India wanted to sign all four foundational defence agreements together but the US wanted to spread these out in order to make India more malleable according to its needs.

The US had earlier termed the relationship with India as a 'Non-NATO Ally', 'Major Defence Partner' and later as a 'Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership', with both countries having signed the four foundational defence agreements to enhance military cooperation.

Key provisions of the 2025 Defence Framework Agreement include the following:

1. Duration and Scope – the framework spanning 2025-2035 establishes a formal mechanism for sustained cooperation;
2. Technology and Industrial Cooperation – it expands joint R&D production and industry linkages between the US and Indian defence sectors;
3. Information Sharing – the agreement enhances interoperability and communication systems;
4. Joint Military Activities – it institutionalised annual joint exercises and officer exchanges;
5. Regional Security – the agreement commits both sides to peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific.

The 10-year defence framework agreement does mark a structured commitment across a decade, recognising India's role as a security anchor in the Indo-Pacific, firming its partnership with the US within a multilateral context. For the US it secures India's role as a regional partner to strengthen deterrence, and contributes to regional balance amid rising Indo-Pacific tensions. For India, it provides access to technology and diversification from traditional suppliers.

But looking deeper, this 10-year framework also has the twin objective of weaning India further away from Russia and use India as a proxy against China (similar to using Ukraine as its proxy to fight the war with Russia) in order to advance its economic and strategic interests. Henry Kissinger had said, "It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal." For India, the lure is technology but Trump is temperamental and unpredictable, who can switch off without any advance indication. Expecting transfer of advanced technology from the US or the West is also utopian, which is supported by past and recent experiences.

Looking deeper, this 10-year framework also has the twin objective of weaning India further away from Russia and use India as a proxy against China

India has long sought access to advanced American platforms ranging from aero engines to intelligence systems. Theoretically, the framework agreement institutionalises technology sharing, co-development and interoperability, meeting India's long-standing ambition for indigenous production under its 'Make in India' programme through co-production initiatives in defence manufacturing. But all this would depend on the sincerity, manner and timings in which the US executes this framework agreement. Will the US respond the way India expects it to? Quantum success of the framework agreement would depend on clear deliverables, transparent technology exchange, and coordinated diplomacy; to redefine the Indo-Pacific security by enhancing India's defence industry, strengthening deterrence, and deepening the Indo-US partnership.

The framework agreement will, however, be subject to certain challenges and constraints. US exports controls and congressional oversight slowing the pace of sensitive defence cooperation demonstrate the limits of technology transfer by the US. Also, interoperability between the Indian and US militaries, especially in communications and logistics, continues to remain uneven despite the foundational agreements like COMCASA and BECA signed in 2018 and 2020 respectively. India on the other hand would be naïve to put all the eggs in the American basket and sacrifice its strategic autonomy. By formalising a decade-long framework, the US is signalling that it views India not as a temporary partner but as a co-pillar in the regional order. But by doing so, the US has also signalled China that the US-India partnership is cemented at least till 2025. Beijing, who has been viewing India in the American camp, will certainly not be happy with this development.

Theoretically, the framework agreement institutionalises technology sharing, co-development and interoperability, meeting India's long-standing ambition for indigenous production

Finally, there is no denying that frameworks are only as effective as their implementation mechanisms. If it is implemented effectively, the framework could redefine South Asian deterrence dynamics, integrate Indian industries into global defence supply chains, and shape the technological balance of the Indo-Pacific over the next decade. But its success will hinge on how both governments translate rhetoric into action; moving beyond rhetoric, photo-ops, false announcements of 100 per cent transfer of technology and not adhering to deals and timelines agreed, to joint production, secure communication links, and sustained information sharing.