The question that MoD officials need to ask themselves is can they provide the Indian military with the operational capabilities that they need or will the Service Chief have to repeat what the Army Chief said during the Kargil conflict, “We will fight with what we have”?

A report in the Times of India dated July 29, 2013, states that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is conducting an internal probe into allegations of irregularities involving a top retired army officer in the proposed procurement of 145 x M-777 ultralight howitzers from the US in a direct governmentto-government deal worth $847 million.

It is not difficult to gauge whom the allegations are against as the officer was present at the stand showcasing the US M-777 ultra-light howitzer during a previous Defexpo at New Delhi. But that is not the point. The issue is whether the anonymous letter can succeed in further delaying the procurement of the M-777 ultra-light howitzers that the Army has fully trial evaluated in accordance with a comprehensive trial directive and selected, and even result in cancellation of the deal and forcing an open tender – implying delay of another decade or so. This is very much possible with MoD seeking comments of the Army, which in turn implies another probe. The timing of the anonymous letter is perfect when as per MoD, the deal was on ‘the verge of finalisation’.

Nothing has really changed over the past three decades plus. In 1980, 17 x 5.56 assault rifles from 11 countries were tried out to equip the then three PARA (Commando) battalions and three PARA battalions of the Parachute Brigade. While MoD was on the ‘verge of finalising the deal’ after an excruciation delay (going through procedures), the Defence Minister received an anonymous letter alleging the Corps Commander under whom the trial had been conducted had been paid $10,000 to facilitate the G 41 of Germany come first. The result was that the money set aside to equip the above-mentioned six battalions in the Army’s Sixth Plan lapsed, the 17 assault rifles were given to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) who took 15 years to produce the current 5.56 INSAS which is nowhere close to state-ofthe-art and the Army is forced to go for import of 66,000 assault rifles – a shame to our defence industry, which may yet be stymied by another anonymous letter. Through such delays, we are actually playing into the hands of our adversaries which may well be by design or inadvertent—both cases making China and Pakistan clap their hands in glee.

MoD’s emphasis on propriety is understood but the penchant to ban firms at the drop of the hat without alternate arrangements to fulfill voids in time is senseless and amounts to disloyalty to the nation. While impropriety must be dealt with and individuals punished, it is criminal to stonewall military modernisation with enlarging China-Pakistan collusive threat and the widening gap between the PLA and Indian military. The armchair warriors in South Block need to shake up from their reverie. No fresh gun has been inducted into the artillery since the Bofors scandal of the 1980s. The DRDO sat on the designs of the Bofors gun for three decades and has just about woken up.

Hopefully, this anonymous letter is not aimed to stalling procurement of the M-777 ultra-light howitzers from the US till the indigenous Bofors is developed and then kill the import altogether though going by the INSAS, an indigenous Bofors is a tall order sans accountability. Defence Minister A.K. Antony himself admits, “New procurements have commenced… but we are still lagging by 15 years.” Ironically, anonymous letters hold the power to multiply this lagging 15 years many times over. Then is the question of enormously multiplying costs for the same equipment due to delays. Army’s Air Defence equipment is almost completely obsolescent – L-70 40mm AD gun system, ZSU-23-4 Schilka (SP) AD gun system, SAM-6 (Kvadrat) and SAM-8 OSA-AK all need urgent replacement. The indigenous Akash (meant to replace the Schilka) failed miserably in army trials and has been given to Air Force in static role as part of layered air defence of vulnerable areas/vulnerable points. The BMP-1 and BMP-2 of the Mechanised Infantry too need to be replaced. Aside from state-ofthe-art assault rifles and carbines, the Infantry equipping in terms of mini UAVs, shoulder-fired missiles, BFSRs, HHTIs, sensors to boost surveillance, battlefield management system, battlefield surveillance system and the like need to be speeded up. Then is the need to boost operational capabilities of Army Aviation, engineers, signal communications, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition. The need for establishing the tactical communications system was never more urgent. The question that MoD officials need to ask themselves is can they provide the Indian military with the operational capabilities that they need or will the Service Chief have to repeat what the Army Chief said during the Kargil conflict, “We will fight with what we have”?

The views expressed herein are the personal views of the author.