The fact is that while Pakistan has continued to tread on the path of terrorism, the TNWs are adding a more dangerous dimension to it under the protective cover of the US administration and Saudi Arabia

At a recent event at Carnegie Endowment, a Washington, DC-based think tank, Khalid Kidwai, a former Pakistani General who reportedly was custodian and planner of Pakistan’s nuclear security and strategy for many years and Adviser to Pakistan’s National Command Authority, advocated that Pakistan needs Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) to deter India’s Cold Start doctrine, which is aimed at a quick punitive military strike in the event of another Mumbai-style operation by Pakistani intelligence. He insisted that development and deployment of TNWs actually made war less likely because India had had to rethink the Cold Start strategy.

Pakistan’s TNWs have been in the news past few years. In its February 2015 update, the Arms Control Association assesses Pakistan has 100 to 120 nuclear warheads. But Wikipedia says Pakistan already had 120 nukes in February 2013 which is two years back. The Council of Foreign Relations of the US recently stated, “Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear programme in the world. By 2020, it could have a stockpile of fissile material that, if weaponised, could produce as many as 200 nuclear devices.” The “if weaponized” part is actually redundant. Considering the various reports of Pakistan feverish pitch to increase her nuclear arsenal and the capacity of the fuel for the purpose through the Chinese reactors installed/being installed purportedly for nuclear energy for civil purposes, it may be assumed that present Pakistani nuclear warheads may actually number around 160 to 180. Interestingly, while discounting the possibility of nuclear warheads falling into the hands of terrorist organisations, Kidwai said that Pakistan’s Shaheen-III missile, test-fired recently with a 2,750-km range, was aimed at countering India’s second-strike capability, possibly from bases it was developing in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands on the far side of India’s east coast, adding that the strength of the rest of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the fear of “mutually assured destruction” of the South Asian rivals would ensure that ‘sanity prevails’.

Incidentally, the Shaheen-III missile has a range of 2,750 km, giving it the capability to reach every part of India — but also potentially to reach into the Middle East, including Israel. Pakistan, however, says her nuclear programme is only India specific. The fulcrum of Pakistan’s TNW is the Nasr missile having a range of 60 km. Pakistan’s development of smaller warheads built for use on battlefields, in addition to longer-range weapons, has increased international concerns that they could get into rogue hands because of the pervasive threat of militants in the country.

What is causing more worry is that Pakistan’s nuclear strategy includes developing nuclear warheads for deployment at sea; both in surface vessels and submarines. Pakistan had already established her Naval Strategic Force command in 2012 and Shireen Mazari, former Director of the Pakistan’s Institute of Strategic Studies based at Islamabad, had admitted, “We are on our way, and my own hunch is within a year or so, we should be developing our secondstrike capability.” Michael Krepon, co-founder of Stimson Centre, has said, “The assurances Pakistan has given the world about the safety of its nuclear programme will be severely tested with short-range and seabased systems, but they are coming…. “A cardinal principle of Pakistan’s nuclear programme has been, ‘Don’t worry; we separate warheads from launchers.’ Well, that is very hard to do at sea.” Being a rogue nation that has a state policy of terrorism, is controlled by its military-ISI with deep deniable links with multiple terrorist organisations, and where part of the political organisation and administration too is linked with radicals both for ideology and survival, to say that these weapons would not fall into hands of radicals, cannot be believed.

The second issue is that if TNWs are needed against India’s Cold Start doctrine, would you really need them in such big numbers? Do you see them being used all over on only in plains sector against Strike Corps? Isn’t it most stupid to think India will not react to TNWs, in complete contrast to what is indicated in India’s nuclear doctrine—a second strike against nuclear attack (read irrespective at any level). Lastly, what about a nuclear accident at sea? Will that not trigger escalation? The fact is that while Pakistan has continued to tread on the path of terrorism, the TNWs are adding a more dangerous dimension to it under the protective cover of the US administration and Saudi Arabia.