The private industry should take note that development of such an important Information Systems project has come into a level playing field without the DRDO hijacking it ab initio for the very first time

The battlefield management system (BMS) for the Army has been cleared as a ‘make’ project by the Defence Acquisition Council. The DG Acquisition, MoD will now order constitution of an Integrated Project Management Team (IPMT) to undertake a study, following which an expression of interest (EOI) will be issued by MoD to the Industry RURs. Going by earlier norms, the IPMT Report should take about 12 months, implying that the EOI can be expected to be issued by October 2012. Considering the response time to the EOI (about 3-4 months), nomination of prototype developers plus development time (about 12 months) and the test bed, Phase 1 may be expected to be completed by 2015 (instead of 2012 that was perceived earlier) provided no further hurdles are encountered. The cascading effect has already delayed completion of Phase II (Equipping) from initial plan of 2017 to 2020 and Phase III (Change Management and Upgradation of System) from 2022 to 2025 as per current status. The private industry should take note that development of such an important Information Systems project has come into a level playing field without the DRDO hijacking it ab initio for the very first time. The BMS is a finance intensive project considering Phase 1 (establishment of test bed lab and field trials at test bed location of one Combat Group and three Infantry Battalion Groups) was earlier estimated to be around Rs. 350 crore.

Overall, financial implication can only be holistically worked out at the end of Phase I but would be colossal since it is to cover battalion/regiment level and below pan army. Therefore, what should be vital to the private industry is to invest heavily into R&D and produce stateof-the-art prototypes well before issue of the EOI – before October 2012. The project must be accorded top priority as it would be the very beginning of large scale private industry partnership in the defence sector. PSUs and individual private industry including consortiums have an equal chance. In all probability, minimum two developers will be chosen to develop the prototypes. It is equally important to understand that should the prototypes not be of the required standard and found wanting, the project will then go the DRDO way, delaying the overall project by yet another few years. More importantly, similar system will eventually be required by the para military forces (PMF) and central armed police forces (CAPF) involved in anti-terrorist operations if we are to achieve national net-centricity to counter the increasing asymmetric threats of terrorism, insurgencies and fourth generation warfare.

The prototype should be developed as a suitable application on an intuitive operating system with GIS suitability customised to meet military requirements. Voice and data communications must be always up. Computer hardware should be rugged and non-obtrusive with retro fitment maintaining platform integrity. System integration should include application software, data links with radio systems, integration of battalion/regiment level sensors BFSR, thermal imagers, UAV/MAV data, satellite imagery, etc. The army must avoid further delays as have already occurred on account of delimiting the BMS and F-INSAS and repeating the feasibility study. Inadequacy in understanding technology at the top echelons is a real problem that needs to be looked at seriously. If this is not addressed, the BMS may get further delayed every time new incumbents take over as Vice Chief and Deputy Chiefs, particularly if someone is hell bent to push computer and radio subsystems and software integration of F-INSAS separately disregarding disadvantages in terms of time and costs including the requirement to develop yet another system to make the two interoperable.

The views expressed herein are the personal views of the author.